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stock, "the Lord was sorry that he had made Saul killg over Israel" (NRSV). 
2. Thanks to Chris Meyers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
review. 
Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, by Stephen Pattison. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. x and 315. $65.00 
DAVID A. HORNER, Biola University; Centers for Christian Study, 
International 
Shame, by its nature, avoids the public eye. So also has it been with mod-
em scholarly analyses of shame, at least in comparison to its near relative, 
guilt. This has changed in recent years, according to Stephen Pattison, 
Cardiff University practical theologian, as "a plethora of books with a huge 
variety of perspectives ranging from literature, sociology and philosophy 
to various kinds of psychology has emerged on the topic of shame" (p. 1). 
Still, a sufficient treatment of shame is lacking in theology, and he has writ-
ten Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology in order to meet this need. 
Is shame good or bad? An impressive history of ethical and religious 
thought weighs in on the positive side of shame's connection to morality. 
Aristotle, e.g., commends shame (aidos), though he rejects Greek tradition 
by not considering it fully a virtue. Shame is a kind of fear of disrepute, 
which can serve to restrain young people from doing shameful acts.! 
Similarly, Thomas Aquinas treats verecundia as a positive element of char-
acter, a kind of preparation for virtue.2 For Puritan moralists, shame, as an 
internalization of moral authority, is essential to moral education.3 John 
Locke concurs: "Shame of doing amiss, and deserving Chastisement, is the 
only true Restraint belonging to Virtue. The Smart of the Rod, if Shame 
accompanies it not, soon ceases, and is forgotten, and will quickly by the 
Use lose its Terror."4 
In light of this tradition, Pattison's account of shame is striking, as he 
focuses on a very different notion of shame, and draws a very different 
moral assessment. He gives brief acknowledgement to shame's positive 
role (pp. 2, 84-85), but does not develop an account of it, or explore its rela-
tion to the negative aspect or kind of shame ("chronic" or "dysfunctional" 
shame) that is his almost exclusive focus. For Pattison, the relation 
between shame and morality is overwhelmingly negative. He draws upon 
literature that is primarily recent, psychological, and sociological in charac-
ter, focusing on studies of "shamed" individuals whose psyches are dam-
aged by traumatic personal experiences. 
Shame is a deeply personal book, drawing from Pattison's own experi-
ence of chronic shame, an experience he attributes in part to his involve-
ment in the Christian faith. (This experience included a "sense of ontologi-
cal guilt, fundamentally defiled identity and basic badness" (p. 7), and an 
experience of "ontological shame," i.e. "shame that relates to being human 
and finding oneself to be limited and mortal" (p. 181).) Pattison sketches 
three objectives for the study, roughly corresponding to the book's three 
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parts: to provide an overview of the various understandings and 
approaches to shame and "try to make sense of the phenomenon" of 
shame; to "attempt to understand" chronic shame; and to "consider the 
relationship between the ideology and practice of Christianity and human 
experiences of shame" (p. 2). His success in reaching these objectives is 
mixed. Pattison's overviews of the psychological and sociological litera-
ture are helpful, particularly in making the range of data accessible to prac-
tical theologians. His efforts toward "understanding" shame, however, 
while illuminating in some aspects, fall short. Finally, while Pattison's dis-
cussion of Christianity and shame will aid in understanding how chroni-
cally shamed people may tend to interpret certain theological ideas and 
practices, it falls far short of making plausible Pattison's conclusion that 
orthodox Christian theology should be jettisoned. 
In part I, Pattison extensively catalogues recent approaches to under-
standing the nature of emotions and shame. Apart from a few passages, 
Pattison's approach to the data may be fairly characterized as "explication 
without evaluation." His methodological commitments make it difficult 
for him to reach his objective of moving from summarizing a "kaleido-
scope" (p. 59) of studies and positions to providing a clear and fruitful 
account of what shame is. Pattison lists and affirms the contributions of a 
variety of disciplines and approaches, favoring some form of a further, 
"social constructivist" methodological approach, one he characterizes as an 
epistemological stance that sees all experience as socially and linguistically 
constructed. He characterizes this approach as liberating, enabling us "to 
take all the insights and approaches [provided by the other approaches 1 ... 
seriously as important languages about shame. However, it does not 
require a commitment to any particular world view. We can look at the 
various ways in which the concept 'shame' is used without being required 
to make a judgment as to whether one way of thinking or speaking about 
shame is 'more true' than another" (p. 60). This relativistic approach ulti-
mately subverts Pattison's overall premise concerning shame, for, once 
adopted, it also follows that there is no basis for concluding that any single 
view of the goodness or badness of shame is any "more true" than any other. 
But Pattison takes it as read that chronic shame is bad, and that, e.g., inso-
far as Christianity's ideas and practices produce shame in people, they 
should be changed. These normative judgments are manifestly non-rela-
tivistic, but Pattison has ruled out any basis for making them. 
Pattison also rejects "over-simplifying approaches" that "would pro-
duce what would then seem to be a speciously monolithic clarity about the 
understanding of shame," abandoning "the quest for narrow definition, 
synthesis, normativity and theoretical exclusivism" (p. 62). Unfortunately, 
it is neither obvious just what these undesirable approaches actually 
amount to, nor what rejecting them actually requires. For definitions or 
rational accounts do not need to be overly narrow or simplistic; indeed, one 
may think that an overly narrow definition just is a bad definition - one 
that does not fully account for all that it needs to explain. Pattison, howev-
er, seems to regard "openness and humility" to require an abandoning of 
the quest for definition itself. He opts for a "methodologically liberating," 
broader approach, which he describes as a Wittgensteinian "family resem-
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blance" theory (p. 61). Unforhmately, again, Pattison does not make clear 
what in this case the family resemblances actually are. His approach 
remains more a "kaleidoscope" of data and information than a prism of 
clarity and understanding. This methodology also leads to inconsistencies 
and gaps within Pattison's account, for he in fact eventually does provide 
what amounts to a rough definition of shame: "a condition that denotes 
alienation, isolation, defilement, depletion and pain, both individual and 
social" (p. 154), and he suggests his own "working understanding" of 
shame, as "toxic unwantedness" (p. 182). Both of these are suggestive. 
However, they sit in tension with Pattison's stated methodology, and 
when these accounts of shame do appear they are theoretically unmotivat-
ed and unjustified. 
In part II Pattison turns primarily to the notion of chronic shame. He 
lists and describes 24 "main characteristics of shame," many of which 
include subsidiary characteristics. In chapter 5 he diverges from the expli-
cation mode, to articulate his own position. Here he considers the effects 
of shame on ethics and morality. "Chronically shamed people are pre-
social and pre-moral ... while they may often behave in socially acceptable 
and conformist ways, they will not really be capable of exercising reliable 
moral judgment and responsibility" (p. 124). Some of the possible moral 
results of chronic shame include anger and rage, addictions, sloth (indeed, 
the whole range of the seven deadly sins), and contempt for others (127). 
From an ethical perspective this discussion raises some interesting and 
potentially fruitful ideas. Here I was struck, however, by the disparity 
between Pattison's almost wholly negative view of the relation between 
morality and shame and the generally very positive view of it in the west-
ern ethical tradition, and the fact that Pattison simply does not develop the 
positive side or even explore its relation to his argument. Granted, this is 
not an ethics book; still, it covers important moral ground, and Pattison 
makes a number of moral claims about shame. His lack of deeper ethical 
analysis leaves a gaping lacuna that, at best, renders his moral conclusions 
inconclusive. I suspect that Pattison's approach evidences a broader (cul-
tural) conceptual shift regarding shame (and related notions), not in the 
terms of the discussion, but in the background framework according to 
which the terms are understood - from something like an "ethical" concep-
tion of shame to a "psychological" conception.5 Pattison's study reflects 
the psychological conception - it constitutes his starting point, and he con-
strues the moral aspects of shame from within that stance. 
Part III deals with shame and Christianity. Pattison surveys contempo-
rary theological accounts of shame, deeming them all to be lacking, partic-
ularly in their recognition of the part that religion itself plays in engender-
ing and exploiting chronic shame. On this score, Pattison's diagnosis of 
traditional Christian thought and practice is severe. According to Pattison, 
the "ascent of the monarchical deity [of Jewish and medieval Christian 
thought] and the rise of human shame are almost contemporaneous in 
Judaeo-Christian mythology" (pp. 235-6). The "God of the Old Testament" 
does not fare well: "The hallmark of divine laughter is of aggressive mock-
ing, scorn and ridicule, not that of merriment and joy. This shame-produc-
ing laughter from a contemptuous, shameless God is not an encouraging 
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starting point for those who would wish theological ideas and images to 
address, reduce and alleviate human shame rather than to exacerbate it." 
Indeed, for Pattison, 'The God of the Old Testament is a kind of all-too-
human oriental despot who overtly exploits shame in the interests of bol-
stering his own power and control" (p. 236). 
Beyond its references that are directly related to shame, Christian theol-
ogy, even in its abstract ideas and doctrines, "may produce" responses of 
shame in shame-prone people. Pattison lists as problematic eleven divine 
attributes, a veritable summary of the historic orthodox understanding of 
God - e.g., that God is: wholly different from human beings; pure and 
holy; perfect, good and complete in "Godself"; omnipotent; omnipresent; 
and that God punishes wickedness and sin. These ideas contribute to, 
among other things, humiliation, unlovableness, inferiority, defilement, 
devaluation of one's embodied humanity, alienation from self and the 
divine, crushing one's sense of goodness, sense of falling short of perfec-
tion, lack of autonomy, and feelings of worthlessness, impotence and 
unwantedness (pp. 236-241). Pattison concludes personally that in order to 
resolve the problem of shame he must reject the historic orthodox Christian 
understanding of God: "If God is no longer all-good and all-powerful in 
the way that I used to think, I am no longer all-bad and passively helpless 
either" (p. 314). 
Further contributing to responses of shame, on Pattison's account, are 
inadequate accounts of the nature and relations between humility, pride, 
and self-esteem, and unclarity about the nature and validity of self-concern 
in Christianity theology and ethics. He concludes with specific suggestions 
for addressing the problematic issues in theology and practice, informed 
by the dominant metaphor of the inclusiveness of the Son of Man who 
came "to seek and to save that which was lost" (p. 309). As noted, this 
involves, for Pattison, a rejection of the orthodox Christian conception of 
God (Epilogue). 
This discussion raises important practical and relational questions con-
cerning how theological ideas and practices may tend to be "heard" and 
"seen," especially by those carrying extra emotional baggage. These ques-
tions, however, may be distinguished from questions about what the ideas 
and practices actually mean and whether they are true or valid. The latter 
questions have historically been considered primary. However, Pattison 
seems eager to jettison them, or to conflate them with the former - as 
indeed his methodology might suggest, when applied to theology. 
"Theology is a set of polysemic images, metaphors, similes, narratives and 
myths ... Because Christian ideas and images are polyvocal, pluralistic 
and susceptible to many interpretations there is seldom one absolutely 
'correct' interpretation ... Theological images and ideas are human arte-
facts that emerge from a particular socio-political and historical milieu ... 
often reveal[ing] more about the human beings who constructed them and 
their world view and assumptions than they necessarily do about the 
nature and being of God" (pp. 232-233). Thus, Pattison appears to think, 
one may justifiably abandon core beliefs of Christian theology when one 
concludes that believing them may engender shame in those who are 
shame-prone. An obvious problem with this stance is that it is self-defeat-
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ing (why not consider this view of theology to be merely a human artifact 
that says more about Pattison than about the nature of reality?) 
Moreover the negative self-esteem implications that Pattison enumer-
ates simply do not necessarily follow from the Christian doctrine of God. 
His account rests upon a kind of ontological zero-sum economy in which, 
if X has a certain amount of power or value, then Y thereby lacks power or 
value to that extent. If God is all-good and all-powerful, then I am all-bad 
and passively helpless. But this view is no more adequate in theology and 
metaphysics than it is in economic theory or any other area. Michael 
Jordan's skill in basketball does not ipso facto reduce my skill; only I can do 
that. True, if Jordan is the world's best basketball player, then, analytically, 
I cannot also be the world's best basketball player. But all that follows 
from that, by analogy, is that if God is the supreme instance of goodness 
and power, then I cannot also be. But how is this a problem? 
More seriously, from the standpoint of traditional Christian theology, 
Pattison's approach has the effect of (following Voltaire's quip) seeking to 
make God in our own image, on the basis of what we think enhances our 
self-esteem. Does this not, in effect, constitute a shaming of God? "How 
long, 0 men, will you tum my glory into shame? How long will you love 
delusions and seek false gods?" (Psalm 4.2).6 
The ingredients for a much more plausible, self-esteem-enhancing ontol-
ogy are available to Pattison within the historic Christian tradition itself, in 
the orthodox doctrine of creation, especially as it is understood along the 
lines of Augustine and Aquinas in their understanding of the metaphysics 
of goodness. On this view, God, the maximally perfect being, and ground 
of all other being and value, out of the overflow of his goodness, chose to 
create fully real natures, which themselves possess great value as created 
things, are good insofar as they exist, and are created by God to develop 
and flourish fully as instances of their kinds. Unlike Pattison's view, which 
holds the very nature of ultimate reality and value hostage to the vagaries 
of one's sense of self-esteem, this account provides a robust metaphysical 
grounding for value, as well as an objective warrant and direction for 
authentic self-realization. Further, with respect to the important issues he 
raises with regard to humility, pride, self-esteem, and self-concern in 
Christian theology and ethics, Pattison would do well to explore the rich 
resources within the Christian tradition of Thomas Aquinas, who grounds 
his ethics in a flourishing-based ethical structure that accounts for both 
self- and other-concern in plausible and biblically faithful ways. Aquinas's 
understanding of the relations between pride and humility is complex and 
nuanced, bringing together both a healthy humility and a healthy, fruitful 
appreciation of oneself and one's gifts.7 
NOTES 
1. Nichomachean Ethics 4.9,10.9. 
2. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 4.17; Summa Theologiae 
IIaIIae.l44. 
3. See J. D. Hunter, The Death of Character: Moral Education in an Age 
Without Good or Evil (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 35. 
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4. Cited in ibid., 35. 
5. This kind of distinction is developed in D. F. Wells, Losing Our Virtue: 
Why the Church Must Recover Its Moral Vision (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1998),34-35. 
6. The biblical tradition does express concern for the kind of shame or 
humiliation Pattison addresses. See Deuteronomy 25.3, where legitimate pun-
ishment should be severe, but not inhumane, where it will humiliate or 
degrade the guilty party. 
7. See D. A. Horner, "What it Takes to be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on 
Magnanimity," Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998), 415-444. 
